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Under a Certain Little Star  
By Wislawa Szymborska  
Translated by Joanna Trzeciak  
 
My apologies to chance for calling it necessity.  
My apologies to necessity in case I'm mistaken.  
Don't be angry, happiness, that I take you for my own.  
May the dead forgive me that their memory's but a flicker.  
My apologies to time for the quantity of world overlooked per second.  
My apologies to an old love for treating a new one as the first.  
Forgive me, far-off wars, for carrying my flowers home.  
Forgive me, open wounds, for pricking my finger.  
My apologies for the minuet record, to those calling out from the abyss.  
My apologies to those in train stations for sleeping soundly at five in the morning.  
Pardon me, hounded hope, for laughing sometimes.  
Pardon me, deserts, for not rushing in with a spoonful of water.  
And you, O hawk, the same bird for years in the same cage,  
staring, motionless, always at the same spot,  
absolve me even if you happen to be stuffed.  
My apologies to the tree felled for four table legs.  
My apologies to large questions for small answers.  
Truth, do not pay me too much attention.  
Solemnity, be magnanimous toward me.  
Bear with me, O mystery of being, for pulling threads from your veil.  
Soul, don't blame me that I've got you so seldom.  
My apologies to everything that I can't be everywhere.  
My apologies to all for not knowing how to be every man and woman.  
I know that as long as I live nothing can excuse me,  
since I am my own obstacle.  
Do not hold it against me, O speech, that I borrow weighty words,  
and then labor to make them light.  
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ABSTRACT  
  
For several decades, thousands of refugees have been fleeing into Kenya, and now Kenya 
is host to the world‟s largest refugee settlement. The mass influx of refugees and their 
protracted situation in Kenya gives evidence that there is a crisis within international 
refugee law.  Refugees are a group of people that have been given a distinct rights 
regime, and their right to freedom of movement has been inhibited due to state practices.  
This is proof that the international refugee protection regime is at risk of breaking down.  
It is creating an environment in which states are resorting to harmful policies of 
containment and restrictions on movement.  This is leading to the development of 
warehousing refugees which is considered a possible new solution to protracted refugee 
situations.  This policy of containment is not a solution to the refugee “problem,” and the 
reality that it is considered a fourth solution among the three durable solutions raises 
concern.  Warehousing is a consequence of the shortcomings of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent 1967 Protocol which were not 
designed to respond to current protracted refugee situations.  Regardless of the legality of 
warehousing under the refugee rights regime, it is a violation of the human right to 
freedom of movement.  The lack of application of human rights law to refugees 
symbolizes the harmful gap that exists between these two international law regimes.  
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I. Introduction 
When Abdullahi Salat was forced to the Dadaab camp as a young boy in 1991, 
fleeing civil war in his homeland Somalia, little more than shrubs and a few tents dotted 
the landscape.  A woman working for the United Nations greeted him in what was then a 
safe haven and a nearly empty environment.  She showed him to his tent and sprinkled 
seeds into his palm. “Plant them,” Mr. Salat remembered the aid worker telling him, “It‟s 
hot here.”  He had told her no that day, since Dadaab was not his home, and he believed 
he would be moving on shortly.  Now he says, “The trees are very huge.”7 
For twenty years, violence and anarchy in Somalia has forced an estimated two 
million Somali citizens to flee the country.
8
  Of these, an estimated half of all Somalis 
fleeing to Kenya comprise the world‟s largest refugee settlement.  Urban refugees have 
also existed within Nairobi, and international aid agencies have long been aware of them. 
Today, there are estimated 40,000–100,000 refugees in the city.9  For several decades, 
Kenya has been a host to refugees.  Now there are over 412,000 refugees living in the 
country making it one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world.  Although the 
Kenyan border is officially closed to Somali asylum seekers, there are 6,000-7,000 “new 
arrivals” each month.10  Kenya is still in the midst of a rapidly escalating refugee crisis in 
both the camps and in the cities because Somalia‟s conflict has yet to be resolved.     
This protracted situation in Kenya is just one of many that serves as evidence that 
there is a crisis within the refugee regime.  There are mass numbers of refugees and this 
brings about concern and frustration when trying to deal with the influx.  This is proof 
that the international refugee protection regime appears to be at risk of breaking down.  
Refugees are state-made foreigners.  The circumstances in which they find themselves, in 
a host country, question their right to freedom of movement and just how free they are to 
                                                          
7
 Josh Kron, Somalia‟s Wars Swell a Refugee Camp in Kenya, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/world/africa/12dadaab.html. 
8
 Melissa Fleming, Neighbouring countries feeling the strain as Somalia‟s emergency grows, UNHCR: THE 
UN REFUGEE AGENCY, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4bde90856.html..  
9
 Sarah Dix, Urbanisation and the social protection of refugees in Nairobi, 35 HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE 
NETWORK, Nov. 2006, available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2841. 
10
 Elizabeth Campbell, Somalis in Kenya: Invest in the Long-Term, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL FIELD 
REPORT (Nov. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/somali%20refugees%20in%20kenya.pdf. 
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go about their daily lives.  This is where human rights law must enter the dynamics; if the 
international refugee regime reaches a point where it actually may break down, human 
rights law can be there to pick up the pieces.  I do not believe that the refugee regime has 
already collapsed, but it is under a considerable amount of pressure.  This pressure needs 
to be countered with support from human rights law.   
There are barriers and discrimination imposed by the Kenyan government and the 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in both the Dadaab camps 
and in Nairobi.  Critique of the refugee regime in regards to the UNHCR‟s role will prove 
that human rights law and refugee law should not be treated separately.  NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) and observers have reported that problems exist, and the 
Kenyan government is taking certain actions to affect or constrain movement of refugees.  
Using Kenya as a case study to analyze larger issues, this thesis will explore the more 
subtle ways in which governments‟ ambivalence about the presence of refugees expresses 
itself in the form of policy towards, and control measures on, refugee populations.  It will 
highlight state actions that restrict freedom of movement and determine whether 
differential treatment towards refugees is indicative of poor application of international 
law.  State actions of confining refugees to camps will be underscored to prove that 
refugee law is outdated.    Despite knowing that refugee law is a specific regime created 
for a particular group of people, the new idea that human rights must accommodate 
refugee law will be emphasized. 
Part I studies Kenya and its domestic as well as international character in the 
refugee regime.  The background will illustrate the situation in Kenya, as it is home to 
one of the world‟s largest refugee settlements.11  It will elucidate the consequences from 
the difficulty of establishing clear movement rights for refugees.  These consequences 
include state actions of warehousing and detention.  Part II explains the right to freedom 
of movement and the limitations on movement of refugees through the lens of human 
rights.  The focus is on the right to freedom of movement and what it entails for refugees 
while reminding the international community that human rights law must assist refugee 
                                                          
11
 Human Rights Watch: From Horror to Hopelessness: Kenya‟s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis 12 
(March 2009). 
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law.
12
  This analysis will be a normative assessment of the policies of Kenya to argue that 
warehousing and detention of refugees are not solutions to the “refugee problem”13 and 
because they are even considered solutions, it is further cause for a push for a human 
rights application within the refugee regime.  There is a problematic gap that exists 
between human rights law and refugee law, and this allows for violations of refugees‟ 
right to freedom of movement.   While states are arguably trying to cope with mass 
influxes of refugees, the lack of human rights application contributes to the ongoing crisis 
of refugees‟ restrictions on movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The word “refugee” will be used if an individual has been recognized under the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as if the individual is considered a de facto refugee.  If the case is 
de facto, the individual is one of the thousands of those forced to leave their home and thus on the move, 
and they have yet to gain official recognition from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).  Asylum seekers are those looking to obtain refugee status and just have not gone through the 
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process yet to be possibly granted refugee status.  Just because they 
are not officially recognized as a refugee does not mean that they should be treated differently than those 
who are officially recognized.  All are people who have been uprooted, and the massive numbers of those 
who have been displaced makes it difficult for a speedy process of RSD. 
13
 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, State-Centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment, 14 MICH. J. 
INT‟L. L. 121 (1992). 
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II. Case Study: Kenya  
A. Background of the Issue 
Beginning in 1992, several hundred thousand Somali refugees crossed the border 
into Kenya‟s Northeast Province as the civil conflict in Southern Somalia intensified.14  
Still today, Somali asylum seekers are crossing Kenya‟s officially closed border by the 
thousands to escape Somalia‟s violence and to seek shelter within three heavily 
overcrowded and chronically under-funded refugee camps near Dadaab in north-east 
Kenya.
15
  Somali refugees remain stuck in a limbo in camps which are now home to over 
300,000 refugees, making them the world‟s largest refugee settlement.16  Dadaab is 
located about 100 kilometers from the Somali-Kenyan border.  The camps were created 
in mid-1992 after Kenya realized it was impossible to run the camps in Liboi due to daily 
violence in the southern border region.  Thus, with security concerns for the international 
staff, refugees, and humanitarian supplies, Dadaab camps were created further inside 
Kenya‟s borders.  Dadaab camps are located in a region that is semi-arid and originally 
sparsely populated by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival of refugees fleeing the 
violence in Somalia.  The massive number of refugees fleeing across the Kenyan border 
when war in Somalia broke out overwhelmed the local nomadic population as well as the 
natural resources which were scarce in the area.  International organizations brought the 
previously marginalized region attention with provision of services such as boreholes, 
hospitals, and schools.  By March of 2003, 160,000 of over 400,000 Somali refugees who 
fled the war remained in Kenya.  Of these, 130,000 were in Dadaab; the remaining lived 
in other camps while some moved to urban areas such as Nairobi.
 17
 
                                                          
14
 Jennifer Hyndman & Bo Viktor Nylund, UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in Kenya, 10 
INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 23 (1998). 
15
 Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 1. 
16
 There are three camps which surround Dadaab.  They are Dagahaley (population 77,036), Hagadera 
(91,982), and Ifo (86,732), accoding to UNHCR statistics on file with Human Rights Watch.  The camps 
are located within an 18 kilometer radius of Dadaab, cover 50 kilometers, and each are separated by 
significant distances, as described in Human Rights Watch, supra note 5. 
17
 Awa M. Abdi, In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity amongst Somali Refugees in Dadaab 
Camps, 22 REFUGE 6 (Winter 2005). 
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The entry of thousands into what is an already severely overcrowded and under-
resourced camp has exacerbated the shortages of shelter, water, food, and healthcare for 
all refugees.  The number of refugees who have directly traveled to Nairobi is unknown. 
They have been described as having „disappeared‟ into the city and do not receive any 
support; they remain invisible to the world.
18
  They may arguably have the right to 
freedom of movement since they can travel throughout the cities, yet Kenya does not 
consider them for refugee protection unless they stay within the confinements of the 
refugee camps.   
Somalis, and other groups of refugees in Kenya,
19
 face a complicated problem – 
they are leaving a situation where security has been destabilized; meanwhile, they find 
themselves living along Kenya‟s borders and within its capital where they face many 
problems.  One of the official positions of the Kenyan Government (which is widely 
supported by the local population), is that urban refugees are an economic burden on the 
city.
20
  Some refugees remain forgotten in camps where they cannot go back home 
because of threats of persecution.  Some move to cities like Nairobi, and others stay in 
camps such as Dadaab and become one of hundreds of thousands waiting for 
resettlement.  While refugees leave their homeland to escape persecution and death, the 
ideal circumstance is that they are leaving a bad situation to arrive in a better one for only 
a limited amount of time.  However, Somali refugees – both within the camps and in 
Nairobi – have remained in Kenya for nearly 20 years.  Kenya sees its refugees as a 
burden, yet it still provides camps for the refugees and gives those living in the camps 
benefits and incentives to remain there and away from the cities. 
Kenya‟s refugee policy has “oscillated, in a distinctly Machiavellian sense, 
between „hospitality and hostility to refugees and asylum-seekers.‟”21  Unlike its 
neighbors Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya had considered itself a transit state.  It also 
                                                          
18
 Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 1. 
19
 Although most of the refugees living in the camps are Somali, there are also refugees from Uganda, 
Sudan, the Congo and other countries suffering from conflict, as described in CARE, available at 
http://www.care.org/careswork/emergencies/dadaab/. 
20
 Elizabeth H. Campbell, Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, 
and Possibilities for Integration, 19 JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES 396 (2006). 
21
 Monica Kathina Juma & Astri Suhrke, ERODING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION IN AFRICA 100 (Nordic Africa Institute, ed.) (June 2003). 
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furthered the Machiavellian mindset and “wielded a heavy stick” against refugees it 
considered a threat to state security.
22
  The refugees who did not threaten Kenya‟s 
security and national interests were treated with ambivalence, and the UNHCR and 
NGOs in the state were allowed to manage refugee affairs.
23
  Kenya‟s ambivalence can 
be seen through its encampment policy of confining thousands of refugees in camps 
while paying no attention to those who are moving freely in the cities. 
B. International Responsibilities 
Kenya has international obligations for hosting refugees.  Kenya signed the 1951 
Convention in 1966 and the 1967 Protocol in 1981.
24
  The Kenyan government is also a 
party to the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.
25
  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees grant specific rights to 
refugees while they are applying for asylum.   State signatories have an obligation to 
grant these rights.     
Kenya became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) without reservations on May 1, 1972.
26
  By belonging to the ICCPR, 
Kenya has international legal obligations to allow for freedom of movement within its 
borders.
27
  Article 12(1) states, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.”28  It also has the obligation to provide the CCPR Human Rights Committee 
with any relevant domestic legal rules and administrative and judicial practices relating to 
                                                          
22
 This is included Somali refugees in the 1990s, see id. at 100. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Hyndman, supra note 8, at 29. 
25
 Kenya ratified the OAU Convention in 1992, as described in Hyndman, supra note 8, at 29. 
26
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 
1976. U.N.T.S. 
27
 See Article 12 (4), General Comments: “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within 
that territory, the right to move freely and to choose his or her place of residence.  In principle, citizens of a 
State are always lawfully within the territory of a that State,” as described by Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 27,  Freedom of movement (Art. 12), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999). 
28
 International supra note 20, at art. 12(1). 
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the rights protected by Article 12.
29
  This is required to prevent officials from taking 
“arbitrary and abusively discretionary decisions” as well as to ensure that those whose 
right to free movement is restricted understand what their rights are.
30
  Further 
international law obligations of Kenya require it to guarantee refugees within its borders 
the right to choose their own residence and move freely throughout Kenya.
31
  In reality, 
however, this is not the case. 
C. Unclear Rights  
Currently, the rights of refugees to move freely within Kenya and to reside in 
urban areas are not clear.  The Kenyan government did pass a Refugee Act in 2006 that 
“[set] out the legal and institutional framework for managing refugee affairs.”32  
Although Kenya has shown lack of support towards its refugees (by allowing both 
discrimination and police brutality towards the refugees to continue), it has made efforts 
to provide for them.  Refugees do make a contribution to the local and national Kenyan 
economy through informal employment and businesses.
33
  However, the legal system that 
Kenya established for refugees still does not afford them their human rights, especially if 
they are in the cities. 
The Refugee Act set out legal framework governing refugees and established the 
institutions and procedures to implement it.  In practice, however, there is inadequate 
capacity and effort to ensure its effective implementation.  Also, there is no national 
refugee or asylum policy that assists the Refugee Act, and there is “some confusion about 
the government‟s official position.”34  Kenya and the UNHCR, in practice, have used 
                                                          
29
 Human Rights Committee, supra note 21. 
30
 Human Rights Watch: Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees 80 (June 2010). 
31
 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, art. 26 states: 
“Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of 
residence and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in 
the same circumstances.” 
32
 The Act has been described as “largely unwelcomed by civil society” yet “represent[ing] a step in the 
right direction,” as described in Sara Pavanello, Samir Elhawary & Sara Pantuliano, Hidden and exponed: 
Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, HPG Working Paper, 8 (March 2010).   
33
. Id. 
34
 The confusion can be seen through various disincentives that the Kenyan government instills on the 
refugees to leave the camps while at the same time refusing to provide additional land for the continuous 
influx of refugees from Somalia, id. at 15. 
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various disincentives to limit the number of refugees choosing to move outside of camps 
while continuing to allow refugees to cross its borders.
 35
  Part of this can be attributed to 
Kenya‟s different asylum policies and its changing attitude towards the refugees. 
D. Shifting Asylum Policies 
Between the years of 1989 and 2007, Kenya‟s asylum policy went through two 
apparent phases.  The first phase was “abdication‟ and containment” from 1989-2002, 
and the second phase, described as the “age of „interventionism” began in 2002.36  Both 
of these phases were reflections of the political dynamics in Kenya during Daniel Moi‟s 
authoritarian regime and current President Mwai Kibaki‟s administration.  The two 
administrations have been described as viewing Somali refugees “through a distinct 
security prism, with the dictates of state security eclipsing their humanitarian 
obligations.”37  The abdicationist policy which Kenya adopted gave the UNHCR 
overarching power when addressing the refugees and influence concerning deals with the 
local population.  Neither the central government nor the local administration was 
consulted when the UNHCR began brokering land deals.  Kenya was not able to offer 
proper and much-needed security surrounding the camps.  Therefore, the UNHCR 
assumed responsibility and subsidized local security personnel and set up police stations 
in Dadaab.
38
  The overall consequence of Kenya‟s abdicationist policy was that the 
camps began to provide a “dangerous refuge” for Somali refugees who had escaped their 
war-torn homeland.
39
 
Refugees in both the Dadaab and Kakuma camps face restrictions on their 
freedom of movement as well as their access to local labor markets.  Since there appears 
to be no solution to the refugees‟ situations at home, high numbers have begun to self-
settle in Nairobi.  However, this is considered illegal under host states‟ laws, and they are 
                                                          
35
 Hyndman, supra note 8, at 3. 
36
 Gil Loescer, James Milner, Edward Newman & Gary Troeller, PROTRACTED REFUGEES SITUATIONS: 
POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 219 (United Nations University Press) (2008). 
37
 Id. 
38
 Monica Kathina Juma & Astri Suhrke, ERODING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION IN AFRICA 105 (ed., 2002).  
39
 Id. at 106. 
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seen as voluntarily giving up their provision of aid.  Therefore, what is seen as possibly 
greater socio-economic independence comes at the price of loss of protection by the 
international community.
40
  There have been attempts at discussing the possible 
advantages of integration into local communities as a solution to the uncertain situation 
of refugees in protracted or warehoused situations.  However, host countries in the sub-
Saharan region such as Kenya are usually disinclined to take up this discussion, let alone 
take initiative to make it happen.
41
 
E. Urban Refugees 
Theoretically, urban refugees in Kenya do not exist.  There is no national 
legislation that addresses urban refugees, so they are sometimes subjected to the 1967 
Immigration Act and the 1973 Aliens Restriction Act of Kenya.
42
  They are not registered 
since they are not in the camps, and they face continuous threats and public statements 
concerning their “illegal” status.  One of the official positions of Kenya‟s government is 
that urban refugees are an economic burden on the city.  The economic burden blame, 
and the position that urban refugees should be forbidden from living and working in 
urban areas, are views which are supported by the local population.
43
   
Before the early 1990s, Kenya had been hosting refugees for decades.
44
  By 1988, 
there were approximately 12,000 refugees living in Kenya, and these refugees enjoyed 
full status rights.  They also had the freedom to move throughout Kenya, as well as to 
apply for legal local integration.  When the conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and especially 
Somalia had caused such vast numbers of refugees to enter Kenya, the Kenyan 
Government became overwhelmed.  Consequently, Kenyan authorities withdrew from 
refugee affairs although it was still a signatory under international refugee law.  The pre-
1991 refugee regime in Kenya was described as “generous and hospitable, with emphasis 
                                                          
40
 Katy Long and Jeff Crisp, Migration, mobility and solutions: an evolving perspective, FORCED 
MIGRATION REVIEW 56 (July 2010). 
41
 Tania Kaiser, Participating in Development?  Refugee protection, politics and developmental approaches 
to refugee management in Uganda, 26 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 353 (2005). 
42
 Campbell, supra note 14, at 400. 
43
 Id. at 396. 
44
 Id. at 399. 
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on local integration,” while the “post-1991 regime has been less hospitable, characterized 
by growing levels of xenophobia and few opportunities for local integration.”45  Kenya‟s 
ad hoc policies used to address refugee issues, as the numbers of refugees crossing into 
Kenya are still increasing, has resulted in reluctance to accept the new refugees.  
However, with no other choice, the refugees are required to live in the camps rather than 
roam around urban centers.  Despite this, there are several thousand refugees who are 
living permanently in Nairobi.
46
  They do run their own small businesses and engage in 
small local trade.  Since they are living independently in the cities, they do not have 
assistance from the UNHCR.  They are consistently the victims of police abuse and 
arrest.  They cannot work legally and therefore they do not have formal positions in the 
Kenyan economy.  This reinforces the economic burden image.  Nairobi‟s refugees are 
the ones who are in “legal limbo” because Kenya no longer recognizes their rights as 
refugees.  Since they are outside of the camps, they do not qualify for any assistance or 
aid from Kenya or the UNHCR.  It is still common, however, to find refugees searching 
for protection by going to the UNHCR Nairobi Branch Office as well as the Ministry of 
Home Affair‟s Refugee Secretariat office.  Most of Kenya‟s focus has been towards those 
living in the camps so there is no defined urban refugee policy or definition as to what 
constitutes an urban refugee within Kenya.
 47
  Urban refugees have freedom of movement 
because of Kenya‟s lack of concern for its urban refugees – not because of the refugees 
receiving any sort of services or benefits from Kenya.  It is Kenya‟s indifference to its 
urban refugees that gives them a false sense of freedom of movement. 
Although Kenya does not officially allow urban refugees to live within the cities, 
it cannot do much to stop them from leaving the camps.  As long as the refugees have 
money for transportation, money to bribe police, and the ability to make it past all 
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checkpoints, they can find themselves in Nairobi where they “slip” into their appropriate 
communities.
48
   
Kenya‟s urban refugees must avoid the Nairobi police if they do not have proper 
documentation or enough money for bribes.
49
  Despite their illegality in the cities, it 
better serves the interest of the Kenyan government to not have the refugees removed.  
They do integrate into society, but the confusion regarding their legality (whether 
intentional or not) allows them to be the ones to blame when something goes wrong 
socially or economically.  This in turn further fuels the xenophobic attitudes that are 
dominant in the cities.
50
  Even as these refugees are allowed to move freely throughout 
the city, they still suffer considerably from Kenya‟s ambivalence towards the overall 
population of refugees.   
F. The Dadaab Camps: An Example of Dangerous Management: 
In 1992, Kenya opened the Dadaab camps, in north-eastern Kenya, eighty 
kilometers from the border with Somalia.  The camps were designed mainly to reduce the 
real or perceived threat that refugees in a host country posed to national security.  This 
policy of containment rested on renouncing responsibility to humanitarian agencies 
(specifically the UNHCR) and pushing refugees to the margins of society.
51
  As a result, 
the refugees would be removed from economic activities and not blatantly discriminated 
against in public society.  Refugees would only be able to qualify for assistance if they 
were living in the camps and not living in urban areas such as Nairobi.  Anyone found 
outside the camps was considered an illegal alien and the threat of deportation was a 
reality.  The security concern of Kenya and the blame of refugees as a burden to the host 
state provided an excuse for the detrimental treatment towards the refugees. 
                                                          
48
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Further, by settling refugees in the Dadaab camps, Kenya hoped that the hardships 
endured by the refugees there would push them to “drift away to their homes.”52  Peter 
Mwangi Kagwanja, the Southern Africa Project Director for International Crisis Group, 
believes that Kenya may have planned to take advantage of the massive flow of relief aid 
to ensure that the local Kenyan population would benefit from the predicted spill-over 
effects, of both resources and infrastructure, which were originally intended for the 
refugees living in the camps.  Kagwanja saw the refugee aid as a vital part of the politics 
in the region.
53
  As the numbers of refugees increased, tensions towards the refugees 
increased, as well. 
The massive influx of refugees beginning in the early 1990s caused hostility to 
arise out of the state.  Kenya accused refugees of smuggling in firearms and escalating 
crime and insecurity within its borders.  Refugees were seen widely as an economic, 
social, and environmental liability and burden.  Most of the refugees that had crossed into 
Kenya were poor and did not have useful skills to offer.  In December of 1992, President 
Moi made a threat to send Somali refugees back by force.  A month later, Moi asked the 
UNHCR to repatriate all of the refugees residing in Kenya – Somali, Ethiopian and 
Sudanese.  President Moi stated that refugees “seriously compromised the security of 
[Kenya] [and] greatly outstretched the infrastructure and medical services.”54  In the 
beginning, refugees were seen as a vital source for aid, but then they were turned away 
because Kenya did not want them on its soil.  Nothing, however, could stop the massive 
flows of refugees back into Kenya.   
In November 2010, nearly 10,000 Somalis fled intense fighting in western 
Somalia and entered Kenya seeking refuge.  Upon entering Kenya, the Somalis were 
forced back into Somalia by Kenya‟s administrative police even though they had 
registered with the UNHCR.  By turning away a high number of refugees under such 
extreme conditions, it shows that the Kenyan government is even now facing extreme 
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exasperation and desperation.
55
  Still, Kenya is host to nearly 340,000 refugees from 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Southern Sudan.  Despite the UNHCR‟s appeals to allow for these 
refugees‟ freedom of movement, they are still, to this day, confined to the camps. 56   
G. Refugee Camps: A Legal Anomaly 
Refugees and their camps are seen as the “essence of aid; they are a visible sign of 
comprehensible and concentrated human need for charity.”57  Answering this call for 
comprehensible charity is adhering to international obligations and taking action to 
provide security for the refugees.  Since the 1950s, when the international protection 
system was created, “[physical] threats have grown worse as sprawling refugee camps 
near conflict zones have become a lynchpin of the refugee protection system.”58  In 
addition, with political and security priorities challenges, the UNHCR is also forced to 
make choices regarding camps locations and protection.
59
  The UNHCR has said that it 
would “prefer to „redirect its efforts to ensure wider freedom of movement‟ for Somali 
refugees „rather than be perceived as condoning encampment.”60  Further efforts have yet 
to be taken. 
Refugee camps and repatriation are the “twin pillars” of the strategy of 
containment.
61
  Refugee camps are a legal “anomaly”62 in regards to the right to freedom 
of movement.  Camps are located directly within the borders and on the territory of the 
host country.  The host country, in an effort to be cleared of its international 
responsibility, will hand it over to the international organizations that are also present on 
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the territory (including the UNHCR).  The consequences of this withdrawing of 
responsibility are seen through both state actions of, and the UNHCR‟s complicity in 
states confining refugees to camps. 
According to the Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), protection 
services are available and free of charge to those living in confinement.  Those seeking 
asylum are encouraged and advised to report to either the Dadaab or Kakuma camps to 
submit their asylum claims.  There is no assistance to refugees living in urban areas; they 
are “expected to take care of themselves.”63  The Department claims that there are 
humanitarian organizations in Nairobi that would assist urban refugees but they must 
contact them for any further help.
64
  
Those with valid documents and who are recognized refugees are protected under 
refugee law against forcible return.  There are to be no proceedings against a person in 
respect to his “unlawful” presence within Kenya if there has been an application 
submitted for recognition as a refugee.  If a refugee has been arrested by the police and is 
facing serious charges, the only suggestion is to immediately inform the DRA or 
UNHCR.
65
  There are no suggestions on how to do this, and it can be assumed that 
issuing any complaint while being detained would be quite difficult. 
The Kenyan DRA stated that those who decide to live outside the camps would 
not receive medical benefits.  However, reasons for obtaining a certain movement pass to 
leave the camps include medical consideration.  The validity of the pass is stated on the 
card, and the holder of the card must return to the designated area before the expiration or 
risk prosecution.
66
  Still, there is no true freedom of movement when holding a movement 
pass.  Subtle management such as this affects the lives of refugees yet it is not enough to 
be seen as a breach of international law. 
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The lack of care and measures for those living in the cities begs the question: 
when does refugee law begin to apply?  Those who live in the cities have freedom of 
movement but they do not have proper consideration and protection from the state. 
H. Nationals vs. Non-Nationals 
The state controls refugees differently than it does with its general population.  
First, a state does not need to know where its nationals are all of the time.  For non-
nationals this is quite different. Kenya, for example, uses its encampment policy to be 
sure of the whereabouts of over 300,000 asylum seekers.
67
  Kenya does not, however, 
have concern for refugees who find their way to urban settings because once the refugees 
are there, they are on their own.  The only way to receive protection and assistance from 
both the state and the UNHCR is to be in the camps.  This causes problems for refugees 
who do not wish to live in a life of encampment.  Human rights can prove itself worthy in 
this situation as systems created to implement the 1951 Convention have not been suffice 
to address mass influxes of arrivals.  Erika Feller, the Assistant High Commissioner for 
Protection, reminds the international community that applying the 1951 Convention in 
situations of mass arrivals poses problems.  Feller calls for action to be taken to address 
the challenge on how to realize solutions for individuals, as well as refugees, that are both 
lasting and protection-based.
68
  Here the human rights regime fits no matter where one 
falls under a state‟s jurisdiction, as human rights apply to all. 
There is a contradiction between human rights and national sovereignty, and this 
has implications for the legitimacy of the state and the rights of nationals and non-
nationals.  The idealization of human rights is based upon this “metaphysical notion of a 
sovereign subject” and it raises the individual‟s concerns over state sovereignty.  This 
happens at the same that affirming the nation-state also means human rights are protected 
and enforced only as nation rights.
69
  They are not considered universal.  Nationalism has 
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ascended to change the state from protecting human rights of “all inhabitants in its 
territory no matter what their nationality” to a state whose function is to distinguish 
between nationals and non-nationals and on this basis to only grant full civil and political 
rights to those who are nationals by origin and birth.
70
  With this transformation, 
citizenship rather than human rights became “the precondition for the effective 
possession of human rights and coincided with the emphasis on mutually exclusive 
citizenries within the nation-state system.”71  Anyone who finds themselves as a non-
national is in-turn a state-made foreigner and when compared to the national, has very 
few rights. 
Refugees suffer lack of citizenship while seeking refuge within a host country.  
The Rights of Man,
72
 which have been defined as inalienable, are no longer that.  
Refugees have no government to back these rights, and they have to fall back on their 
minimum rights.  This leaves them with no authority to protect themselves and no 
institution willing to instill and guarantee these rights.  There is a paradox of human 
rights in the instance of refugee rights: “…while the protection of human rights within the 
international system is inseparably tied to state sovereignty, states are also authorized to 
deprive citizens of those same rights and to exclude individuals from the condition of 
nationality that would enable them to have human rights.”73 
  The reason for there even to be a discussion concerning the relationship between 
refugee law and human rights law is because of the “limbo” that refugees are continually 
stuck in.  It is a limbo because the refugees are “neither assimilated, integrated nor 
immediately eliminated.”74  They are forced to leave their homeland while seeking 
protection and resettlement in order to continue their lives. Kenya‟s encampment policy 
is a visual reminder of the gap between the two regimes, and more specifically, the lack 
of freedom of movement and Kenya‟s ambivalence towards its refugees.  However, the 
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gap can be filled if Kenya fulfills its international, humanitarian and political obligations 
that ensure refugees basic human rights, especially the right to freedom of movement. 
 All of the elements discussed above comprise a discussion of how one reaches 
human rights in the refugee world.  There is a complex gap which is not only about 
human rights – the focus extends further than this.  First, human rights law and refugee 
law are different.  Human rights law, as previously mentioned, can be there to pick up the 
pieces, but because of the dichotomy between the two regimes, it is not as easy as that.  It 
is more complicated because the discussion focuses around a specific group of people 
who have their own rights regime because of the circumstances in which they find 
themselves.  This group of people, who have been forced to move, suffer from a lack of 
human rights and more specifically, a lack of the right to freedom of movement.  There is 
a limitation on movement by states, clearly.  So, if there is a limitation on refugee 
movements, what does this mean for freedom of movement for refugees?  This question, 
and the notion that the warehousing is considered a fourth solution, is what lead to the 
conclusion that there needs to be a stronger human rights focus within refugee law.  
Discussing the freedom of movement of refugees is risky and complicated because 
freedom of movement is found in human rights language.  Human rights of refugees can 
be problematic because these are two different regimes.  Without human rights discussion 
there is no freedom of movement for refugees. 
I. A “Movement” Pass for Refugees 
In Kenya, refugees who have been forced out of their home country and have 
found themselves in the camps must work their way through a hierarchy of power that 
would provide them with a pass. This “movement permit” gives them permission to leave 
the camp or settlement but refugees‟ right to freedom of movement is constrained 
through administrative and legislative practices.
75
  Refugees resort to producing fake 
passes, and these have been described by both the UNHCR and Kenya‟s DRA as being 
difficult to distinguish from valid passes.  Thus, Kenyan police often forcibly turn back or 
                                                          
75
 Zachary A. Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and IDPs in Africa: Making the 
Existing International Legal Regime Work, 18 BERKELEY J. INT‟L. L. 281 (2008). 
  
18 
arrest refugees who are carrying valid movement passes that are valid.  There are 
instances in which refugees carrying valid movement passes are arrested or turned back 
even when it is known that these passes are valid.  According to an official working for 
an agency in Dadaab, “Now we don‟t know from one day to the next how restrictive the 
policy will be.”76  One instance occurred during February 2010 in which police at the 
Modikare check point arrested four refugees traveling to Garissa for medical care.  
Although all four of the refugees had valid movement passes, as well as their medical 
documents, the officers looked at the four refugees and told them, “You don‟t really look 
sick.”  Consequently, all were returned to the camps.77 
 The DRA has taken measures to prevent Kenyan police from turning back or 
forcibly returning refugees who are traveling with valid movement passes.  However, so 
far, it has been described as unsuccessful.  The DRA has taken steps to provide police at 
checkpoints with daily updates on whom are traveling with valid movement passes from 
Dadaab to Garissa and then from there to Nairobi.  This attempt to avoid refugees from 
being detained or taken to court has been unsuccessful even with the UNHCR‟s help.  
The UNHCR claims that it has provided police at the Garissa checkpoint with UNHCR 
phone numbers for them to call if they have any doubts but no phone calls have been 
made.
78
 
 Kenya‟s obligations through international refugee law require it to guarantee 
refugees the right to choose their own residence as well as to be able to move freely 
throughout Kenya.  Kenya is only allowed to limit movement, whether it is of nationals 
or non-nationals, if it is “provided by law…and necessary to protect national security, 
public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”79  Also, the 
restrictions must be non-discriminatory and seen as necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.  
This also leaves room for open interpretation for Kenya to determine what it sees as a 
legitimate aim.  A restriction on a refugee‟s freedom of movement in Kenya must be 
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proportionate in relation to the aim sought to be achieved by the restriction.
80
  While 
refugees often have a valid movement pass, there is a distinct violation of this privilege 
by measures taken to limit their movement. 
J. State Fears Lead to Warehousing 
Kenya‟s concern for its refugee situation might be expressed through common 
state anxieties that refugee protection will lead to permanent immigration.  The duty that 
comes with admitting refugees within a state‟s border as well as the costs with their 
arrival (and often, their protracted stay) are never fairly proportioned among receiving 
host countries.
81
  Even though few governments admit refugee status with permanent 
residence, there is little thought or effort by states to “dovetail the modalities of 
temporary asylum”82 and create permanent solutions that do not display hostility or 
negligence of refugees‟ human rights.   
By warehousing the thousands that have sought protection within Kenya‟s 
jurisdiction, Kenya has created a permanent solution for its Somali refugees.  Recently, in 
2004, the U.S. Committee for Refugees in their World Refugee Survey coined the term, 
“warehousing” to describe the housing of refugees seeking asylum.  The term “shed new 
light on old problems and create[d] fresh insight into the reasons for such problems.”83  
Kenya has never officially adopted a policy which requires Somali refugees to stay in 
camps.  Although Kenya does not want refugees within its borders and while it is not 
acting aggressive or hostile toward the refugees, it is still not welcoming.   
Kenya‟s actions have supported the observation that the asylum process serves 
more as a police function than a humanitarian function.  This reinforces the “us” from 
“them” notion.  It also reinforces the Machiavellian idea that sovereign power supersedes 
a state‟s concern outside of its borders.  The conflict here is that refugee law requires 
                                                          
80
 Id. 
81
 James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 117 (1997). 
82
 Id. at 119. 
83
 U.S. Comm. For Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2004 21 (2004), described in Traci L. Massey, To 
Keep Water, Water: How We Missed the Mark with Cote d‟Ivoire‟s Warehoused Refugees,” 31 N.C.J. INT‟L 
L. & COM. REG. 209 (2005-2006). 
  
20 
states to have a responsibility to protect those who are crossing into its jurisdiction.  The 
nexus of sovereign power and refugees can be characterized as a powerful system of 
global apartheid.  This apartheid establishes a permanent underclass of superfluous 
human beings
84
 and further enforces the division between human rights law and refugee 
law.   
1.Warehousing as a Fourth “Solution” 
There are three durable solutions to refugee outflows, generally.  They are 
voluntary repatriation, local integration into the host society, or resettlement to another 
country.  A fourth solution has been also seen – warehousing.  It has been described as a 
forth de facto and “all-too-durable” solution.85  Warehousing is the practice of keeping 
refugees in protracted situations with major restrictions on the right to freedom of 
movement.  There is restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and unwanted dependencies 
since their lives have been put on hold and their rights restricted.  There are different 
standards as to what a protracted situation may be.  Some believe it to be more than five 
years in exile with no end in sight.
86
  Regardless, warehousing is focused upon the denial 
of the right to freedom of movement although states may see it as a way to handle the 
refugee problem and protect national security and local employment.  The UNHCR‟s 
Global Consultations on International Protection stipulate that, “A protracted refugee 
situation is one where, over time, there have been considerable refugees‟ needs, which 
neither UNHCR nor the host country have been able to address in a meaningful manner, 
thus leaving refugees in a state of material dependency and often without adequate access 
to basic rights (e.g. employment, freedom of movement and education) even after many 
years spent in the host country.”87  What a state sees as handling its refugee issue is in-
turn negatively affecting refugees‟ right to freedom of movement. 
There are historical and political reasons why host states in Africa increasingly 
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rejected local integration of refugees from the 1970s onward in favor of warehousing.
88
  
These reasons include concerns regarding both economic and environmental burdens (in 
both poor and richer countries), security concerns, anger at being „abandoned‟ by richer 
countries who also have similar international legal obligations for protecting refugees, 
fear of the domestic ramifications of xenophobia, and the realist need to reassert 
sovereignty over porous borders.  Also, host governments benefit from the international 
aid associated with encampment, which “would not be forthcoming for self-sufficient, 
integrated refugees.”89  The arguments stem from a realist state-centric perspective and 
are based on the assumptions that state rights (sovereignty) trump individual rights, and 
that citizen rights trump human rights. Based on these assumptions, warehousing is seen 
as a legitimate means to prevent perceived threats and gain desired benefits for the state 
and for citizens without injuring any significant interests (since refugee interests are not 
considered a priori significant).
90
 
 While human rights law respects movement generally, it is the legal articulation 
that discriminates between the forms of movements.  It supports, paradoxically, free 
human movement that is disciplined and bounded by state sovereign coercion.
91
  In his 
book, The Global Community,W.M.Spellman explains that “[t]ogether with unpredictable 
shifts in climate, natural disasters and threats from hostile neighbours, a life of movement 
was the norm for most people and, as a result, fixed notions of territory and resource 
appropriation, the „mine and thine‟ were largely absent from the collective assumptions 
of the group or kinship community.”92  It also has been a de facto right in every practical 
sense because it has been exercised freely by anyone who historically had chosen to 
actually exercise it.  Within the “annals of international morality, [freedom of movement] 
was recognized freely long before the development of modern international law.”93  
                                                          
88
 Tara Polzer, Negotiating Rights: The Politics of Local Integration, 26 REFUGE 5 (2011). 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Mark F.N.Franke, The Displacement of the Rights of Displaced Persons: An Irreconciliation of Human 
Rights between Place and Movement, 7 JOURNAL OF H.R. 269. (2008).  
92
 W.M. Spellman, THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, 1 (Sutton Publishing Limited) (2002), as described 
Satvinder S. Juss, Free Movement and the World Order, 16 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 
203 (2004). 
93
 See Juss, id. at 316. 
  
22 
Therefore, there is evidence that freedom of movement across national borders is a basic 
human right because it has a long and well-known history.  
Article 28 of the 1951 Refugee Convention requires signatory states to issue a 
travel document to refugees.  The travel document represents the „core‟ of the rights of 
the refugees and the international refugee regime.  The Article stipulates that travel 
documents shall be issued to refugees lawfully staying in the host country‟s territory.  
States should also be sympathetic to refugees who are unable to attain a travel document 
from the country of their lawful residence.
94
  The article further proves how vital the right 
to freedom of movement was regarded after the Second World War when the Convention 
was created and the world saw the mass numbers of refugees the War had produced.
95
  
Those being forced to move should have effective means to disengage from detrimental 
state policies that have failed to adhere to international human rights law.  Failure to 
enhance protection of refugees through human rights and ensure their right to freedom of 
movement “signals a retrenchment to a paradigm where individual liberties are 
subjugated to political expediency.”96  
 By restricting freedom of movement and enforcing policies of warehousing, this 
policy of containment has proven to regard refugees in a category different from 
nationals and therefore requiring different rights.  Yet, these refugee rights are not 
enforced or practiced, either.  Refugees are now often seen as “problem people” as well 
as a “collective source of anxiety and potential instability due to their „irregularity.”97  
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The response to the influx of refugees within a state‟s borders has consisted of tightening 
border control as well as migration policies.  It has also consisted of looking towards the 
UNHCR for relief.  So, instead of focusing on granting refugees asylum and integrating 
them into society, the strategy has been to contain them and restrict their rights;
98
 this is 
largely because unlike nationals, refugees are often deemed a threat to state security.  
Warehousing refugees prevents them from exercising their basic human rights and 
because it is seen as a fourth solution, it supports the growing gap between the two 
regimes of international law.   
 
2.Warehousing Effects 
Warehousing, a euphemism for restricting refugees‟ right to freedom of 
movement, is usually seen in dangerous and isolated areas. Warehousing is rarely done 
for humanitarian reasons but to protect the political and economic interests of the state.  
Warehousing threatens refugee protection.  Human rights cannot be respected in the 
camps.
99
  Refugees do not have freedom of movement and thus suffer in the camps from 
“high incidence(es) of violence, exploitation and other criminal activities.”100  Due to 
prolonged confinements in the Dadaab camps, Somali refugees become bored, depressed 
and resort to chewing khat leaves.
101
  As the effects from the khat leaves wears off, they 
become aggressive against women and girls.
102
  
Warehousing can also bring collective punishment and allow the administrators of 
the camps to operate without any sort of checks on power in regards to the treatment to 
the confined refugees.  For example, in Kakuma in 1994 and 1996, food distribution was 
withheld from the entire camp for weeks at a time in order to find the unidentified 
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persons who had been vandalizing enclosures that were used for counting the refugees 
and distributing rations.
103
 
Warehousing also inhibits voluntary return when refugees are subject to military 
leaders in the camps.  This is in the host country‟s best interests if it does not wish to 
have refugees within its borders.  Warehousing refugees can make their disempowerment 
even worse as they sit confined all day and “become spectators in their own lives rather 
than active participants in decision-making.”104  Freedom of movement and the right to a 
travel document are both described as “Anti-Warehousing Rights.”105    
Security is still the rising concern and justification for warehousing.  Refugees 
living in disputed border areas may be a risk, and camps can become “hotbeds of political 
agitation.”106  Camps are used for drug smuggling, human trafficking, and gunrunning.  
Camps also fall under military or political elements which undermine local law 
authorities.  An example here is the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) using the 
Kakuma camps to recruit people for the rebel forces.
107
   
Refugees are also seen as an economic burden so warehousing solves this issue of 
possibly burdening the host country and society.  One argument for encampment and 
segregated settlement that limits freedom of movement is, “Given the large numbers of 
those who need to be integrated, the very low or negative economic growth rates, the 
high population growth rates, the drastically declining commodity prices and agricultural 
output and the debt crisis, it is imperative that African host governments [keep refugees] 
in spatially segregated sites so that the cost of their subsistence would be met by 
international refugee support systems…All other talk about integration is wishful 
thinking based on inadequate understanding of the economic, social and political realities 
of the present day Africa.”108  This argument does not take into consideration the reality 
that those who are segregated have their human rights restricted and their daily lives 
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come to a complete halt.  It also ignores the truth that once states segregate communities, 
they are often forgotten about and the segregated living becomes a protracted situation. 
Because refugees are deprived of their human rights, they are “simultaneously 
integrated within the decision-making authority of sovereign power and segregated from 
the normalized territory of potential host states.”109  Refugees are integrated within the 
decision-making authority when laws and restrictions are considered to keep them 
contained and limit their freedom of movement.  This is what causes them to be 
segregated from the normalized territory.  The recent policies and practices of states, 
including warehousing and providing disincentives to leave situations of encampment, 
have redefined refugees through an exclusionary process which places them outside the 
host community.  Typically the host community and society are seen as those holding 
human rights when compared to refugees.  Since they are not “right-holders” within the 
realm of sovereignty, they are instead “superfluous human beings in a state of permanent 
limbo.”110  Consequently, Kenya, a state with responsibility for over 300,000 refugees,111 
has a reputation with the refugees that is “turning sour.”112  Kenya‟s ambivalence towards 
both its containment of refugees in the camps and its apathy towards the refugees in the 
cities persists because of the lack of human rights application. 
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III. Freedom of Movement: What Does This Right Entail? 
Freedom of movement is the „first and most fundamental of man‟s liberties.”113  It 
is basic among the element constituting liberty and what it means to have it.  The 
freedom to leave one‟s own country to go to another enables those wishing to escape 
corrupt or abusive political systems that deny them their other rights and freedoms.  This 
allows for freedom of movement to be seen as a right of “last resort”114 and proves that 
freedom of movement is a foundational and basic human right.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) establishes the right to 
freedom of movement.  Article 13 states, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence with the borders of each state; and (2) [e]veryone has the right 
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”115  The ICCPR also 
states that everyone has the right to freedom of movement.
116
  Article 14 of the UDHR 
recognizes that all persons have the right to movement as a means for protection. This is 
in order to protect their civil and political rights.
117
 
The ability to access a foreign country or territory is considered a necessary 
component of the right to freedom of movement because it allows individuals to have the 
alternative of participating in social processes of another state.  The importance of this is 
that it allows for development of freedom and appreciation of life.  The right to free 
movement is so fundamental that the realization of human aspirations and development 
depend upon it.
118
  The UDHR‟s statement on freedom of movement is not completely 
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supported because the right to leave a country cannot be fully exercised unless there is a 
corresponding right to enter another country. The right to freedom of movement is not 
fully accepted.  The continuous need by states to protect themselves from an influx of 
other people who are not like the host community or may be deemed a threat to national 
security or to the state economy
119
 leaves the right to freedom of movement to be 
neglected.  Further, Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
stresses the importance of the right to freedom of movement as well as the right to seek 
asylum.  In addition, the right to leave and return to one‟s own country is also given 
importance.
120
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination protects the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of a state.  The Convention also states that it “shall not apply to distinctions, 
exclusions, restrictions, or preferences made by a state party to this Convention between 
citizens and non-citizens.”121  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) establishes the “equality of men and women 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field.”122  It does not contain any right to freedom of movement, nor 
does the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment. It prevents non-refoulement
123
 but it does not affirm the right to freedom 
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of movement.
124
  These all include adults but children are not forgotten, either, as they 
also make up a large portion of the refugee population. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child states that, “States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is 
considered in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures 
shall…receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of 
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention.”125  Although Article 10 allows for a 
child to enter or leave a country for purposes of family reunification,
 126
 there is still no 
freedom of movement allowed and this process of reunification is left in the hands of the 
state.  The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families recognizes that “[m]igrant workers and members 
of their families shall be free to leave any state, including their State of origin” and they 
also shall have the “right at any time to enter and remain in their State of origin.” 127  
Note that this does not include freedom of movement or a right to enter into any state.   
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action from the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights “stresses the importance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol 
and the regional instruments” so that there is reaffirmation that “everyone, without 
distinction of any kind, is entitled to the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution, as well as the right to return to one‟s own country.”128  There 
are no further rights from this.  The right to secure asylum is left out, as well, as this is 
considered “exactly the situation that pertained nearly half a century ago when the UDHR 
was proclaimed.”129 
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Article 5 of the General Assembly‟s Declaration on the Human Rights of 
Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live states, aliens 
lawfully in a territory of a State shall enjoy the right to liberty of movement and freedom 
to choose their own residence within the border of the State.
130
 
Freedom of movement may be considered one of the more tolerant practices 
which many cultures have in common when there is peace and progress in a society.   
Immigrants, however, are voluntary migrants and for them, freedom of movement is only 
half a right.  This is because the state has a right to pass laws to exclude them and it does 
not privilege an individual‟s right over the state. 131  Unfortunately, this very issue has 
been seen in the refugee regime, as well.  Refugees are excluded from national laws and 
not afforded the right to freedom of movement that nationals enjoy.  The comparison 
between nationals and non nationals will be discussed later. 
The right to return also relates to the freedom of movement. The right return to 
one‟s own country protects against government repression.  It forbids the state from 
exiling or forcibly returning those who are seen as a burden or threat.  The right to return 
also strengthens the right to leave a country in the case of non-nationals.  If a non-
national wants to return, it would typically mean that they have a safe place to go back.
132
  
Further, the obligation for states to respect the right to return to one‟s own country is 
much stricter.  The ICCPR specifically states that individuals should be not be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee concludes that there “are 
few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one‟s own country 
could be reasonable.”133  The Convention on the Rights of the Child allows for no 
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restrictions on the right to return.  This is for the purpose of reuniting families.
134
  There 
are different aspects to freedom of movement of refugees that go beyond detention.  
Freedom of movement is required everywhere, both within the refugee regime as well as 
the human rights regime. 
A. Necessities 
The right to freedom of movement is an individual right which has to be faced 
with a state-based international community whose concern is regarding human 
migration
135
 as well as sovereignty.  A right to leave it does not automatically mean a 
right to enter another state.  This is a problem of any type of migration. 
 Article 26 of the Refugee Convention states that, “Each Contracting State shall 
accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and 
to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances.”136  Government and UNHCR officials often claim that 
refugees‟ freedom of movement is actually not inhibited.  However, there are obstacles 
and gaps in the law that make it difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to exercise their 
right to freedom of movement. 
An important issue concerning host countries and their treatment towards refugees 
in regards to freedom of movement is the common (yet not obvious) action of keeping 
refugees near the border of their country of origin.
137
  States may argue that refugees are 
only in transit and that they will soon be leaving, either back to their homeland or 
resettled to another country.  Therefore, the practice is to keep them near the border and 
away from the host country‟s society.  However, an article in the 1969 Convention states: 
“For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a 
reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.”138  The description 
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“reasonable” in regards to distance from the border leaves the interpretation open to 
states.  This policy that is used by state discretion has led to many attacks on refugees 
who have not been able to move beyond their designated living areas.  In Africa, “it is the 
rule rather than the exception that refugees are settled close to the borders.”139  The rule 
here which contradicts the international obligation is justified by the hope of temporary 
protection.  States hope that they will only be providing temporary security and shelter. 
Then the fighting will cease in the refugees‟ homeland and they will return.  This denial 
causes refugees harm and the continual suppression of their freedom of movement causes 
further harm and violations of international law. 
The limitation on freedom of movement is done, whether blatantly or more 
discreetly, in order to prevent refugees from integrating into mainstream society.  Also, 
camps and settlements provide the state with means to oversee the refugee population and 
know of their whereabouts at all times.  Refugees are accepted as temporary guests until 
the reasons that have created their displacement are eliminated.
140
 
B. Push for Human Rights Law 
Solutions to refugee problems depend on international solidarity and burden-
sharing, together with parallel developments in those institutions competent to examine 
root causes and measures to avert flows.  Detention, however, involves for the 
international community and UNHCR both a basic human rights issue and a basic 
protection issue.
141
  Next to life itself, freedom of movement is among the most precious 
of human rights.
142
  Detention plays a main role when state governments wish to prevent 
and suppress crime.  Circumstances of flight may generate criminal liability where 
refugees enter a receiving country illegally or without proper documentation.  The 
majority of refugees, however, are not guilty of serious crimes.  In assessing the current 
situation in Kenya, or any host country which keeps it refugees in containment, critical 
                                                          
139
 Lomo, supra note 131, at 282. 
140
 Gaim Kibreab, Why Governments Prefer Spatially Segregated Settlement Sites for Urban Refugees, 24 
REFUGE 30 (2007). 
141
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 20 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 194 (1986). 
142
 Id. at 195. 
  
32 
attention must be paid to the state practice towards refugees in regards to rights under 
both refugee law as well as international human rights law.
143
 
If refugees are subject to the same laws as nationals in the negative connotation, 
then they must be regarded as such in the light of international human rights law.  
Refugees who are often subject to the same law as nationals are exposed to punishment 
or detention on account of illegal entry or any entry or movement without valid 
documents.  Detention is also ordered when the refugee is seen as a public or national 
threat to security.  This happens to nationals, as well.  It is no different, except that with 
refugees, the detention is often joined with any immigration violations or offences.
144
   
Distinguishing between nationals and non-nationals allows for a global apartheid 
to exist, and this lets the nation-state remain at the core of all decision-making.  It 
remains the political and administrative unit,
145
 even though there are international laws 
that state other responsibilities.  The idea of „inclusion‟ and that those who are included 
are tied to the national identity is an issue that perhaps international law cannot solve.  
This can result from the globalized world where “whole classes of people – including 
refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrant workers – become de facto if not de jure stateless 
persons as the mutating borders of exclusion continually deprive individuals and 
communities of the ability to effectively exercise their civil, political, social, and 
economic rights.”146  This ensures that stateless persons are continually in limbo.  They 
are caught between the conditions they fled and the conditions they find themselves in 
while in the host country.  They are often not integrated but the state‟s ambivalence has 
kept them on the territory, often isolated.
147
  Refugees in protracted situations must be 
included here.  The containment and segregation policies as practices of a global 
apartheid call for recognition of such principles as the right to freedom of movement.  
The “limitations of freedom of movement has…been the precondition for enslavement,” 
and the right to have rights cannot be properly guaranteed and exercised without a 
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corresponding guarantee of freedom of movement.
148
  Without the right to freedom of 
movement, there is no possibility for refugees to obtain other rights.  While living in 
protracted situations, under warehousing policies, the one who is making the decision on 
the refugees‟ living conditions and movement limitations essentially possesses the 
refugees‟ civil rights.  This enforces that the sovereign power requires a condition of 
inequality for it to function – limits must be placed upon the right to freedom of 
movement and there must be some type of exclusion
149
 for a sovereign state to assert its 
supremacy and authority over its territory and the people living on it. 
C. Differences between Human Rights and Refugee Law 
In comparison to the system of international human rights protection, the 
international refugee regime “can be considered as having greater potential to ensure 
compliance with international refugee protection standards.”150  In support of this, the 
UNHCR can play an effective supervisory and de facto enforcement role in the 
application of international refugee law and related human rights standards.  However, 
the systems of both refugee and human rights protection differ in significant ways.
151
  In 
regards to limitations of the refugee regime, there is no formal mechanism, like there is 
for human rights protection, for receiving individual or inter-state complaints or petitions.  
Secondly, the UNHCR has not given full effect to Article 35 of the 1951 Convention 
which is a Contracting State‟s duty to provide the UNHCR with information regarding 
implementation of the Convention.
152
  There is also no system of country practices that 
                                                          
148
 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times, San Diego, New York and London: Haroucrt Brace, 1968. 9, as 
described in Hayden, supra note 63, at 265. 
149
 Hayden, supra note 63, at 266. 
150
 Brian Gorlick, Human Rights and Refugees: enhancing protection through international human rights 
law, NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH Working paper No. 30. Available at 
http://www.jha.ac/articles/u030.htm. 
151
 Id.  
152
 1951 Convention, art. 35: “The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed 
it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of 
the provisions of this Convention. 2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other 
agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United 
Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and 
statistical data requested concerning: (a) The condition of refugees, (b) The implementation of this 
  
34 
can be used to formulate observations and recommendations for states and therefore help 
ensure compliance with international refugee protection standards.  The extent of the 
UNHCR‟s involvement in protection and human rights issues concerning refugees 
depends upon state‟s allowance of the UNHCR to exercise its mandate in a particular 
country as well as provide the UNHCR with available and appropriate resources for the 
operation.
153
  As a consequence, there is a considerable obstacle and hindering in the 
UNHCR delivering its protection mandate.  With limited human and financial resources, 
there is limited effort the UNHCR may be able to produce.  This is also a perfect 
opportunity for Contracting States to step up to their responsibilities and duties under 
international law and ensure that human rights are applied to those living within their 
borders.  They already have the help of the UNHCR there, so it is time that States took 
advantage of that.  Otherwise, there is no point in having mass numbers of refugees on 
their soil as well as the UNHCR and then not ensuring that human rights are afforded. 
The first requirement of actual human rights governance is recognizing that 
refugees in the camps are covered by human rights law.  Ralph Wilde, a member of the 
International Committee on Human Rights Law, asks the question, “[D]oes international 
human rights law apply to individuals who claim asylum but who have not had their 
status determined by the host state, or does their “temporary” status obviate this?”154  
Regardless of the label that someone who has been moved carries, human rights law does 
apply.  Most of the refugees in the camps meet the criteria for refugee status regardless of 
the determination by the host state.  In Kenya it is difficult to fathom granting official 
refugee status to over 300,000 asylum seekers.  However, the individuals should be 
entitled to all the rights that are afforded to refugees since “determination is declaratory, 
not constitutive, of refugee status.”155 
Erika Feller argues that the gaps in refugee protection do not derive, by and large, 
from the legal framework.  It is abound with principles and guidelines.  There is a gap, 
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and the gap lies in implementation, with access to asylum, or its provision on adequate 
terms which are not fully guaranteed or reliable.
156
  However, there is no recognition of 
freedom of movement in practice so refugees are “swiftly losing ground” in terms of 
legal protection provided by states.  Many states have pledged their responsibility to 
international refugee law yet have also undertaken radical changes through their domestic 
legislation and inter-state arrangements.  This results in restrictions to asylum and 
provision of legal rights, of human rights, to refugees.  The practice of states that limits 
refugees‟ freedom of movement is the policy of encampment, or warehousing, or 
administrative detention.  Whatever it is called, it is a violation of refugee law and in 
turn, a violation of human rights law.  This “regressive”157 approach is seen in many 
traditional asylum countries that claim to be overburdened with refugees.  It cannot be 
denied that there is a gap in the international protection regime; the arrival of such a vast 
number of asylum seekers crossing sovereign states‟ borders as well as the potential 
abuse of the asylum process and procedures have resulted in a large burden on some 
states.  As a Refugee Law Training Officer in Stockholm, Brian Gorlick, states, “[I]t 
should be recalled that the system of international refugee protection could not have 
foreseen these unprecedented and wide-ranging developments to avoid state 
responsibility.”158  Because of this, Gorlick asserts, a gap exists. 
Alice Edwards focuses on conceptualizing the relationship between refugee law 
and human rights law.  The regimes form part of the same legal schema.  Tradition and 
isolation of refugee law from human rights norms as well as the institutions means that 
refugees have lived without recourse to rights which are they are entitled to as not only 
refugees but as human beings. 
Gorlick reminds us that although there is a majority focus by states to enhance 
immigration control mechanisms, and these difficulties of reconciling such control 
objectives with obligations are founded in refugee law, there ought to be a similarly-
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major focus on another body of international law – international human rights law.  The 
High Commissioner for Refugees, in her address to the 54
th
 session of the Commission 
on Human Rights, stated that there is an “impressive array of international, regional, and 
national human rights standards and structures which must continue to evolve to ensure 
that gaps and weaknesses are identified.”159  So, the gaps and weaknesses are those in the 
body of international law which begins with implementation of refugee law.   
Human Security Now is a Commission on Human Security which has studied 
“People on the Move” generally.  To the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol‟s credit, a 
report of Human Security Now states that these make up the “most developed normative 
framework…for refugees.”160  However, it is the application that is lacking, and there is a 
gap which persists because of the missing application of human rights law with refugee 
law.  One of the main focuses, right to freedom of movement, affects both those who 
move voluntarily as well as those who are forced to leave and depend upon the host 
country for protection and enforcement of rights. 
 In 1995, the UNHCR Executive Committee called upon the Office “to strengthen 
its activities in support of national, legal and judicial capacity building, where necessary, 
in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.”161  One argument is 
not only should the UNHCR support developing justice systems in post-conflict 
situations, but the Office should also work toward making judicial authorities and the 
legal community aware of human rights problems facing refugees and other persons of 
concern.  By building awareness and expertise amongst legal and administrative 
institutions and other actors, he says, there can be a positive impact on developing 
favorable administrative practices and in some instances policies and jurisprudence.  
Therefore, the strength of UNHCR‟s field presence should not be underestimated “in 
respect of its overall potential to build upon the system of international refugee and more 
broadly human rights protection.”162  States must not solely depend upon the UNHCR but 
instead support its purpose and advocacy towards ensuring that refugees are afforded 
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their rights as both refugees and human beings. 
D. The Inter-Relationship between Human Rights and Refugee Law 
Without human rights, there would be no basis for refugee rights, as “[t]oday‟s 
human rights abuses are tomorrow‟s refugee movements.”163  Human rights abuses are 
the core of population displacement, yet there is little research done that tests the 
relationship between human rights abuses and the movement of people seeking protection 
outside their country of origin.
164
  There are inherent human rights that accompany a 
refugee wherever he or she goes, regardless of whether a border has been crossed or 
nearly approached upon.  Since a host country must respect the human rights of anyone 
under its jurisdiction and on its territory, the human rights of refugees are part of the 
larger human rights protection regime.
165
  The relationship between the violation of 
human rights and refugee movements is causal.
166
  The Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR, in its 1988 Conclusion No. 52 (XXXIX) on “International Solidarity and 
Refugee Protection,” stated that it had a “deep concern over the serious violations of 
human rights which accompany refugee problems and the dislocation and distress they 
cause for millions of individuals involved.”167  The concern is justified as refugee law is 
affected by states‟ ambivalence towards its refugees as well as its desire to maintain 
sovereignty.   
Alice Edwards believes that asylum policies and practices by governments 
question the scope of the 1951 Convention.  She sees western governments 
“implementing hard-line or restrictive asylum policies and practices in order to deter and 
to prevent asylum-seekers from seeking refuge on their territory, including by 
interception and interdiction measures, visa controls, carrier sanctions, „safe third 
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country‟ arrangements, administrative detention, and/or restrictive interpretations of the 
refugee definition.”168  These restrictions on freedom of movement are due to states‟ 
ability to keep international refugee law distinct from human rights law and “flout 
minimum standards.”169  It is custom for the UNHCR to view refugee law as part of the 
(what should be) broader international human rights framework, yet it does not always 
stress its obligatory nature and instead offers suggestions and guidance for States‟ 
standards domestically-speaking.
170
 This allows for states to take advantage of the gap 
between the two international law regimes.  However, as Edwards states, understanding 
the inter-relationship is crucial in order to be able to identify the obligations of countries 
of asylum.  To Edwards, this is a starting point of any sort of determination of the 
standards of treatment for refugees (even though it is still often neglected).  It is accepted 
that human rights law can “support, reinforce or supplement refugee law.”171  Although it 
may appear obvious, the right to freedom of movement, which is a basic human right, is 
linked to successful actions taken towards durable solutions.  This is why it is beneficial 
for host states to ensure that refugees are afforded this protection.  The State is exhibiting 
responsibility from the start by establishing camps, so it must further that responsibility to 
include enforcement and assurance of basic human rights. 
In Canada v. Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the protection of 
those at risk of human rights violations is “the lens through which refugee law must be 
focused.”  The decision in June of 1993 in the appeal of Patrick Francis Ward “broadens 
the scope of the definition to include those genuinely lacking protection from imminent 
harm while cutting shy of those who have other viable options than to seek refugee 
status.”  The Ward decision makes lack of protection by the state the central element of 
refugee definition.
172
  Yet, there is a tension between what is seen as the right to respect 
and dignity as a human being, regardless of where they are, and what is often seen as the 
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right of all sovereign nationals and states to safeguard their own interests.
173
  States 
complain that there is an „erosion‟ of sovereign freedom as the there is a continuous 
deference to human rights and migration law.  The conditions and circumstances under 
which it is considered possible to shift displaced persons‟ rights claims are not found only 
in the lack of political will by states to respect and protect refugee rights.  Neither are 
they found in poor interpretations of the law.  Instead, they are rooted in the “discursive 
limits”174 within which the modern human rights regime now functions.  The discursive 
limits are attributed to the gap between human rights law and refugee law. 
 Counter-arguments have insisted that the human rights regime is not divided and 
the human right to freedom is founded within the authority of sovereign states.  
Internationally-speaking, there are no laws of rights of the displaced unless there is 
codification from the „emplaced‟ states‟ citizens.  This way, the rights of displaced 
persons may be different but they are still under the heading of human rights law created 
by sovereign states.
175
  Under the heading of refugee law, states who are signatories to 
the conventions are not obligated to admit anyone onto their territory.  A state is 
responsible to provide asylum to those who make refugee claims on the state‟s own 
territory.  This further enforces the idea that those who are displaced are subject solely to 
state governances and jurisdiction 
1. Refugee Law and its Origins in Human Rights Law 
The refugee protection regime has its origins “in general principles in human 
rights.”176  By looking at the UDHR‟s Article 14 and its right to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution
177
 along with “unanimously agreed human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” one can see that this “squarely places [international refugee law] within the 
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human rights paradigm.”178  After all, the Senior Legal Coordinator for the Division of 
International Protection at the UNHCR in Geneva Alice Edwards reminds the 
international community that even though refugees are not specifically mentioned in the 
UN Charter, it was not an oversight considering the post-World War II environment and 
massive refugee flows helped initiate the creation of the United Nations.
179
  The inclusion 
of this particular article in the UDHR reinforces this. 
 Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner‟s Programme 
(ExCom) reiterated the obligation to “treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance 
with applicable human rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant 
international instruments.”180  In their allegiance to the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol, Contracting States “[r]eaffirmed [their] continued commitment, in recognition 
of the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, to upholding the values 
and principles embodied in these instruments, which are consistent with Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which require respect for the rights and 
freedoms of refugees.”181  This pledge was in 2002 – ten years into Somalia‟s civil war 
and Kenya‟s policies of containment towards the refugees. 
 The 1951 Convention‟s preamble states its decent from the UN Charter as well as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
182
  The 1951 Convention and other refugee 
law instruments codify rights which states are responsible for providing to refugees.  The 
1951 Convention is “very much a living document which, despite its vintage, maintains 
its relevance in respect of providing a normative framework to address contemporary 
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refugee problems.”183  Despite the scope of human rights which is applicable to everyone, 
national or not, the provisions are often ignored or manipulated by the receiving host 
state.  Refugee law provides human rights standards for refugees, and within the 
framework of human rights, one of the very important standards is the right to freedom of 
movement.   
Since its inception, refugee law has been a “means of reconciling the commitment 
of states to discretionary control over immigration to the reality of coerced international 
movements of persons between states.”184  In other words, refugee law can provide 
assistance to states who are forced to distinguish between those moving across its 
borders.  There are some movements that states cannot avoid, and these movements can 
come in massive numbers.  By establishing a regime which claims to objectively define 
those with a preferred right to admission, refugee law legitimizes the protectionist 
norm.
185
  In many respects, refugee law crosses the threshold enforceability past which 
international human rights law has found it difficult to continue.  Refugee law provides 
an enforceable remedy – available under specified circumstances – for an individual 
facing human rights abuses.
186
  The refugee law regime is “generating a serious body of 
law that elaborates basic human rights norms and has important implications in – and 
beyond – the refugee context.”187   
2. Protection and the UNHCR 
The uniqueness of the international refugee protection system lies in its roots – a 
legally binding and standard setting treaty – which itself borrowed heavily from universal 
human rights principles and customary international law.  International refugee protection 
has evolved and developed not only through the experiences, practices and 
implementations of its language by principal actors such as State signatories and the 
UNHCR.  Refugee law has also developed through the contribution of a variety of 
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international instruments, the work of intergovernmental bodies, including regional 
organizations, and jurists
188
 who parallel their work with human rights law.  Refugee law 
and human rights law must work together to fill in the gaps of implementation.  A state 
cannot delegate human rights duties, so the UNHCR is present within state territory.  
However, proof that the refugee system is collapsing, and the lack of enforcement of 
human rights protection comes from the UNHCR delegating state responsibilities.   
The UNHCR is a rights-based organization.  To the UNHCR, refugees are 
“victims of human rights abuses, or human rights deficits, and they lack a national 
government willing or able to redress their situation.  Protection, at its most basic, means 
activities to restore rights…[p]rotection is also about the creation of an enabling 
environment so that these, and other rights, have a real chance of being enjoyed until a 
durable solution is found.”  Protection of human rights is first a state responsibility, but 
often the UNHCR is called upon to be the “deliverer of protection.”189  Because of this 
calling, the UNHCR has “crossed the line”190 that was once the division of human rights 
law and refugee law.  It has already done this with the establishment within the United 
Nations that works with refugees.  As the UNHCR continues to exercise its capacity as a 
human rights monitoring and intervening agency, while trying to balance the role of 
providing humanitarian assistance, it must also seek to remain attentive to the human 
rights of refugees in the host country.
191
  The solutions for refugees are dependent upon 
the restoration and protection of their rights – foremost the right to freedom of 
movement. 
The promotion of human rights principles as part of its protection policies is 
described in the UNHCR‟s policy paper.  This policy paper is the first time UNHCR has 
addressed the “interrelationship of human rights and refugee protection in a 
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comprehensive manner.”192  The UNHCR states that human rights bodies (in particular, 
treat implementation bodies), have become “increasingly aware of the relevance of 
refugee protection problems to their mandates and have been actively seeking a UNHCR 
input into their deliberations.
193
  The policy paper also stresses the founding principle of 
the UN Charter relating to collective and individual responsibility for human rights
194
 as 
well as mentioning the UNHCR‟s first address to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
in which the linkage between human rights concerns and refugee issues was expressed.  
The linkage was described as the following: 
Violations of human rights are a major cause of refugee exodus and in its efforts 
to curb such violations this Commission also contributes to the prevention of 
refugee flows.  Violations of human rights also create complex problems of 
protection in countries of asylum […]  Finally, too, restoration of acceptable 
human rights situations in countries of origin can be the key to successful 
resolution of long-standing refugee problems.  It is clear that human rights 
considerations are central across the spectrum of the refugee problem, from 
departure through refuge to the realisation of a lasting solution.
195
 
The policy statement is important in that it provides the UNHCR with a general guideline 
of how to incorporate human rights “standards, information and mechanisms” in its 
protection activities.
196
   
A fundamental strongpoint is the day-to-day presence of UNHCR protection 
officers in field situations.  This allows UNHCR officials to develop an appreciation of 
the country conditions and potential solutions to refugee protection problems as well as a 
likelihood of different approaches having a favorable outcome.  A continuous field 
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presence is important for assessing as well as monitoring the extent of human rights 
issues in a particular region since the host state has basically passed its protection 
responsibility onto the UNHCR.  This has an impact on protecting or producing refugees.  
Assessments may develop into a strategy to take remedial action through intervening and 
working with government authorities, legal or national human rights institutions as well 
as NGOs.  This way, assistance programs and protection initiatives towards protecting 
and ensuring human rights for refugees can be developed and implemented.
197
 
Although UN mechanisms may not provide a framework of protection as 
expansive, reliable and accessible as some domestic systems,  international human rights 
law has contributed to this international legal system which can be invoked in support of 
both specific cases and more broad – based advocacy on behalf of refugees.  The 
UNHCR can use the laws and mechanisms to enhance protection principles and give 
effect to forms of enforcement.  The recent developments in human rights law, including 
the UN Commission and Sub-Commission on Human Rights as well as the Human 
Rights Committee, can assist in refugee protection.
 198
  
Besides the variety of the scope and application in the international treaties, 
difficulty is in the enforcement of rights.  Ensuring that refugees are afforded their human 
rights while still being kept in parallel with refugee law instruments is the difficulty 
involved with the gap.  Under human rights, there is an established system of treaty 
bodies playing a supervisory role that ensures states are complying with their 
obligations.
199
  There is also the limitation of state agreement with the actions the UN can 
take, as well as the provisions of the human rights treaty under which the state is a 
signatory, which can hinder human rights law from enforcing refugee rights.  The 
UNHCR has the “necessary personality” within international law to engage with the 
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human rights law that applies to refugees,”200 making it one example of how to render 
human rights of refugees possible. 
E. Lack of Freedom of Movement: The Sovereignty Challenge 
1. Right to Leave and Return 
The element of refugee choice is being compromised both with respect to the 
right to leave and the right to return.  Thus, the only right being upheld is the right to 
remain.  This is “suspect,”201 according to Bill Frelick, the director of Human Rights 
Watch‟s refugee program.  It is also challenging because the right to remain is also being 
enforced by the state restricting refugees‟ freedom of movement.  Since even durable 
solutions involve movement, any restriction on freedom of movement is also against a 
state‟s interest to relieve itself of its refugee “problem.”  Therefore, it is in both the state‟s 
interest as well as the refugee‟s interest for there to be an assurance of the right to 
freedom of movement.  The state‟s ambivalence is hindering itself from addressing its 
refugee issues in political and economic terms as well as humanitarian. 
The traditional state-centered international regime of human rights is continually 
battling against the right to freedom of movement.  Critics of the discord between rights 
of displaced persons and rights of nationals believe that the rights of the displaced fall 
within a category aside from international human rights law.  The rights of the displaced 
actually support the autonomy of sovereign peoples. They argue that the international 
obligations created for states regarding any displaced persons are not exactly human 
rights law.  They are not universally-recognized, and therefore they are their own 
category of rights stemming from “narrow treaties made by states for the purposes of 
securing the international social order within a state-based discipline of human rights.”202 
                                                          
200
 Ralph Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Why and How UNHCR Governance of „Development‟ 
Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 108 
(1998). 
201
 Frelick, supra note 184, at 273. 
202
 Franke, supra note 167, at 264. 
  
46 
2. State Protection 
Satvinder Juss argues that the legal right of a State to exclude people is often 
asserted as an expression of its sovereignty.  Sovereignty, he affirms, implies absolute 
power.  However, state power cannot be described in terms of sovereignty because 
sovereignty is not a state of affairs nor is it a fact; it is “simply a doctrine.”203  Since one 
of the core functions of a state is to protect its citizens, it can be assumed that a state, 
while exercising its sovereignty, regulates migration in and out of its jurisdiction.  
General Comment (GC) No. 31 of the ICCPR on the “Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation” states that, “Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States parties 
respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons 
under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise 
remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 
of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country 
to which the person may subsequently be removed.”204  International law provides 
occasions in which States may restrict freedom of movement.  These circumstances are 
very limited.  Both the ICCPR and the Rights of the Child prohibit states from restricting 
the right to leave any country except when it is to “protect national security, public order, 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”205  The restrictions must 
also be consistent with the other rights recognized in those same treaties. 
F. Human Rights of Refugees: It Gets Complicated 
Submitting to international pressure and hoping to repair previous losses and rifts 
with outside financiers, Kenya had suspended its threat to forcibly remove its refugees.  It 
„grudgingly‟206 allowed them to settle within Kenyan territory.  It allowed them on 
Kenyan soil with conditions.  The refugees could only stay if they resided in camps in the 
northern parts of Kenya.  This would be to abate feelings of insecurity and threats to the 
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tourism industry.  Therefore, Kenya pressured the UNHCR to repatriate all refugees to 
camps near the Kenyan border with Somalia,
207
 away from interaction with locals in 
major cities and urban areas. 
While governments may proclaim a willingness or duty to assist refugees from 
countries who have suffered havoc and massive human rights violations, there also 
appears to be a “pattern of defensive strategies”208 that assist host countries in avoiding 
the international legal obligation found in refugee law.  For refugees themselves, perhaps 
what has been described as increasingly marginal relevance to refugee law does lead to 
the belief that there is an overall lack of protection.
209
  If there is protection, it is because 
of a state‟s realist-centric vision that actions such as warehousing could in the long-term 
assist a state in protecting its citizens without having to give up any jurisdiction, and a 
state could still argue that it is upholding its legal obligations under international refugee 
law. 
The goal of refugee law is not enforceability, at least in the strict sense.
210
  Instead 
it is described as a mechanism by which state governments agree to compromise their 
sovereignty to independent action in order to manage complex refugee issues, contain 
conflict, and avoid catastrophe.  It also attempts to promote decency.
211
  Juggling 
between these aspects while maintaining sovereignty, Kenya has acted on its 
responsibility to refugees by establishing the camps.  However, it must further 
demonstrate its responsibility by ensuring freedom of movement for its refugees. 
Camps and settlements in host states perpetuate refugee status rather than end it 
by preventing incorporation into society.  Kenya has done this with warehousing in the 
Dadaab camps and incorporating a useless movement pass system.  By placing the camps 
so far from society and close to the Somali border, Kenya has been successful at keeping 
refugees segregated so they maintain their old relationship with one another and keep 
their national identity.  This segregation allows Kenya to prevent the refugees from 
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competing with locals for many necessities including employment, land, housing, water, 
pasture, firewood, transportation services, and any income-generating activities.
212
  
Similar to surrounding countries such as Sudan, those who live outside of the Dadaab 
camps and travel to and from the camps face serious risk of being arrested, detained and 
deported.
213
  As long as the refugees are kept in distinct groups in the camps with little 
movement opportunities, they are no longer seen as a threat (or arguably, a burden).  If 
the refugees are allowed to travel to Nairobi or any other city outside of the camps, they 
could easily “melt”214 into local communities and become indistinguishable which would 
cause a problem for Kenya.  It would cause a problem for any country which depends 
upon international donor funds.  Therefore, the placing of refugees in segregated camps is 
seen as necessary for shifting responsibility from the host country to the international 
community.
215
  In this case, it is easier for Kenya to hand responsibility over to the 
UNHCR because the refugees are there in the camps.  There is no hiding them, and they 
are there for the international community to have responsibility over, not among local 
Kenyans for the Kenyan government to try to distinguish apart.  Kenya may think it is 
doing its fellow UN assistants a favor by keeping refugees segregated, but by limiting 
their freedom of movement Kenta is still violating both its responsibility to international 
refugee law and human rights law. 
Forcing refugees to remain within a camp is a violation of their freedom of 
movement unless the governing authorities can show any of the following: that this 
forcing is based on clear and precise law; that it is being done only to meet a legitimate 
aim for the country and is the least restrictive means to achieve the specific aim,
216
 and 
finally, while balancing the impact with the desired legitimate aim, it must be 
proportionate and non-discriminatory.
217
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While the Somali refugees are not “warmly welcomed” in Kenya, the Kenyan 
government has been obliged to accept them because of its commitment to international 
law.  Mostly, however, Kenya accepts them because it needs the continued support of 
donor countries.
218
  With its neighbor Somalia caught in an ongoing civil war, Kenya 
does have legitimate security concerns and a right to control what happens within its 
borders.   However, the conflict in Somalia continues to feed the refugee problem within 
Kenya‟s borders and as long as Somalia is unstable, Kenya will experience the 
repercussions.  Kenya did close its borders in 2007, but 4,000 Somalis a month are still 
crossing the border.
219
  Kenya‟s relations to its refugees and its signs of ambivalence 
create different opinions as to whether Kenya is trying to rid itself of its refugee 
„problem‟ or if it is acting accordingly to its obligations under international law.  Kenya‟s 
tolerance of the refugees is most likely due to the UNHCR accepting full practical 
responsibility.
220
 
G. Justifications for Restrictions of Movement 
Kenya‟s Refugee Act of 2006 offers every refugee the entitlement to every right 
which Kenya has an international obligation.
221
  However, the Kenyan refugee law also 
allows for authorities to establish camps, confine refugees to those camps, and on 
exception allow certain refugees to travel outside the camps if they have a valid pass.
222
  
Kenya‟s constitution states that a person‟s freedom of movement may be restricted if it is 
“reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, or public order.”223  The 
interests may only be invoked if they meet the following criteria: 
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Non-discrimination 
A restriction on movement must not have a discriminatory effect.
224
  Differential 
treatment between non-citizens and citizens based on their citizenship must also be 
strictly justified.
225
 
 
Provided for by national law 
 Any restriction on freedom of movement must be distinctly set out in domestic 
law.  This is to prevent any state official from making arbitrary and abusive decisions.  It 
is also to ensure that those who have their right to free movement restricted understand 
their rights. 
 
For a legitimate aim 
 A restriction on freedom of movement must be justified by the following aims 
which are found within the ICCPR: national security, public order and health, or the 
rights and freedoms of others.  Kenya must be specific regarding how any of these aims 
require a restriction on movement.  The measure taken must be proportionate to the 
pursued aim. 
 
Necessary 
 Of course a restriction on freedom of movement must be considered necessary 
and the restrictions “must be provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of these purposes and must be consistent with all other rights 
recognized in the Covenant.”226 
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Proportionate 
 In regards to proportionality, the least restrictive measures possible on freedom of 
movement must be taken to meet the aim.  The state must balance three factors to 
determine which is least restrictive: first, the extent of the restriction; second, the impact 
on peoples‟ exercise of the right affected; and finally, the state must consider why the 
restriction is necessary to bring about the desired aim.
227
 
 Kenya is obligated under international law to balance all of these factors.  One 
example is forcing a group to stay within the camp boundaries.  This is a violation of 
their freedom of movement.  States must be show that based on the above criteria, 
restricting movement meets a legitimate aim and the least restrictive measures are being 
taken.  The impact must also be proportionate and non-discriminatory. 
 Restricting only refugees‟ freedom of movement is discriminatory regardless of 
whether they have obtained a movement pass.  The movement pass system does not meet 
the criteria because it is very subjective.  It is ineffective because there is no one to 
monitor the police at checkpoints who decide whether a refugee is allowed through.  
Kenya has created an image that it seeks to help its large number of refugees on its soil, 
especially with its Refugee Act of 2006 but this conveniently does nothing for setting out 
the precise criteria on which the police may justify restricting refugees‟ freedom of 
movement.  According to Human Rights Watch, Kenyan authorities have not been able to 
say why they have restricted the movement of nearly 300,000 refugees in Dadaab and 
why this would be necessary to achieve any aims.  In fact, there has been no stated 
aim.
228
   
H. Responsibility-Sharing Rather Than Burden-Sharing 
The artificiality that has been created, between human rights and refugee law, has 
caused states to look to the UNHCR to deal with its burden-sharing.  In fact, it is seen 
more as burden-sharing than responsibility-sharing and the UNHCR should not be 
expected to take on all of the states‟ roles in protecting refugees‟ rights.  Providing 
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effective protection to refugees has become more difficult as conflicts continue to ensue 
and push groups of people out, where warring factions lack legitimacy or proper 
authority, and where there is a lack of accountability in regards to compliance with 
human rights (or even humanitarian) behavior.
229
  The UNHCR cannot be expected to 
solve a state‟s refugee problem, and there needs to be “some rationalization of 
responsibilities”230 in order to introduce more effective and thus better outcomes of 
protection.  Changing the mindset from burden-sharing to responsibility-sharing arises 
recognizing that refugees are not only a problem but also part of the solution.  It also 
stems from recognizing that host countries are often the least equipped financially and 
logistically to assist refugees in situations of mass influx.  Therefore, the UNHCR is often 
dependent on states offering asylum to share the task
231
 and this hinders refugee 
protection as a whole. 
The roles that the UNHCR holds, and its complicity in human rights violations 
such as warehousing, demonstrate the gap that exists in refugee protection between 
traditional international legal norms and the reality of the practical implementation.  
UNHCR has acquired de facto sovereignty while assisting Kenya in following through 
with its international obligations.  Even though the UNHCR is exercising this type of 
sovereignty, de jure it is only an invited guest.
232
  This further proves that the system is 
under a considerable amount of pressure and that international human rights law is not 
applicable to a relationship between refugees and the UNHCR.
233
  Rather, human rights 
law is applicable to the relationship between refugees and the state. 
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IV. Conclusion 
There is a crisis within the scope of protection for refugees.  What would be the 
applicable law regime is no longer meeting the interests and needs of whom it applies.
234
  
The local efforts of the UNHCR as well as the domestic legislation that is seen in Kenya 
are attempts of affording refugees their rights under the international law regime.  
Unfortunately, however, there is nothing in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol 
that prepares these actors and instruments for situations of mass influx.  The host state 
has the “primary responsibility for ensuring security in refugee camps and refugee-
populated areas.”235  By delegating responsibility to the UNHCR it is delegitimizing its 
role as a sovereign state and proving that the 1951 Convention is outdated.  Kenya‟s 
ambivalence to both its refugees in the camps and in the cities exemplifies the challenge 
of arguing that refugees‟ right to freedom of movement must be sought through a human 
rights lens.  Without the support of the international community and human rights, 
countries that are legally responsible for protecting refugees would not have any means 
of meeting their responsibility.   
For Human Security Now, the Commission on Human Security, it is not just 
about refugees who are moving.  There are many groups of people moving.  The  issue is 
not the legal distinction between the groups on the move but rather that there are actually 
people moving within and across country borders to improve their livelihood, escape 
poverty, seek new opportunities, rejoin family members, or because of war, violent 
conflict, human rights abuses, expulsion or discrimination.
236
  The movement of people 
must be looked at from all dimensions, being sure to take into account the political, civil, 
security, economic and social reasons people move.  Human Security Now recognizes 
that today‟s policies, norms, and institutions are not taking into account all that they 
should, and consequently there are major gaps left to fill regarding movement.   
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The current “legal muddle”237 that delegates state responsibility to the UNHCR 
intensifies the “cleavage”238 that exists in refugee protection.  Although the UNHCR is 
exercising de facto sovereignty, it is only de jure an invited guest.  It is assisting in the 
host country‟s obligations and from this standpoint onward, international human rights 
law can only be applicable to refugees and the host state rather than refugees and the 
UNHCR.
239
  This confusion perpetuates the problematic gap that exists between human 
rights law and refugee law.  It is necessary to consider human rights law in the 
deficiencies of refugee law; otherwise there will continue to be a crisis. 
 The refugee population is continuing to become more protracted.  The average 
length of major refugee situations has increased from nine years to twenty, from 1993 
until present day.
240
  The reality of perpetual protracted situations exploits the gap 
between human rights and refugee law, and it puts failure on the international community 
to protect the refugees which, in essence, it has created.  The UNHCR faces the challenge 
of upholding its norms and responsibilities while working within a state sovereign system 
that deals with massive numbers of refugees.  To fulfill its mandate of protection, the 
UNHCR must play a more “facilitative and catalytic role”241 in order to encourage states 
to fulfill their international responsibilities. 
 Human rights are required because refugee law is not sufficient to meet the 
movement needs of refugees.  Freedom of movement is a part of the human rights 
vernacular, and there is little forward discussion on the human rights of refugees as such.  
There is a serious protracted condition in Kenya that proves there is a weakness, or a 
crisis, in the refugee law regime.  This is crucial time for human rights law to enter the 
discourse. 
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